task-commander

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 1, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a significant surface for indirect prompt injection (Category 8) by interpolating untrusted external data into agent prompts.
  • Ingestion points: The skill ingests untrusted data from bug reports (bug-investigation.yml), feature requests (feature-build.yml), and web research sources including Reddit, Hacker News, and Twitter (research-deep.yml).
  • Boundary markers: Absent. Untrusted content is interpolated into templates using simple variables like {{bug_description}} or {{web_findings}} without structural delimiters or specific instructions to treat the content as data rather than instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The orchestration system has extensive capabilities including file system writes, and execution of shell commands via git, npm, and npx across all workflow files.
  • Sanitization: Absent. The skill relies on subsequent LLM "Reviewer" or "Verifier" steps to catch errors, which are themselves vulnerable to the same injection techniques.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs extensive shell command execution to manage the development lifecycle.
  • Evidence: Commands such as git checkout, git commit, git add, npm ci, npx tsc, and npx vitest are used in workflows like 'overnight-batch.yml' and 'feature-build.yml' to automate testing and version control.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads external software dependencies as part of its migration and environment setup tasks.
  • Evidence: Use of npm install and npm ci in 'migration.yml' and 'overnight-batch.yml' to fetch packages from the official npm registry, which is a well-known service.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Apr 1, 2026, 05:34 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — task-commander