clarify-confirm-continue
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill inherently possesses an attack surface for indirect prompt injection because it autonomously reads and fact-checks workspace files (Phase 1) using tools like
grep_searchandview_file. A malicious file in the workspace could attempt to influence the agent's planning process. However, the workflow is designed to be resilient to this by enforcing a mandatory readiness gate in Phase 2. - Ingestion points: The skill utilizes
grep_search,view_file,list_dir,code_search, andmoma_searchto ingest content from the current project environment. - Boundary markers: The agent is instructed to transform its findings into a structured summary (Goals, Non-Goals, Settled Decisions, Execution Plan) which acts as a clear boundary for user review.
- Capability inventory: The skill restricts all mutating commands (file writes, branch creation) until Phase 3, after explicit approval is received via the
ask_questiontool. - Sanitization: The risk is mitigated by the 'human-in-the-loop' requirement; the agent cannot proceed to execution without a user explicitly reviewing the plan and selecting a 'proceed' option.
Audit Metadata