deslop-duplication-audit
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 14, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the agent to install the
desloputility from an unverified source using multiple methods, includingcargo binstall deslop,cargo install deslop, andmise use -g github:Nimblesite/deslop@latest. It also explicitly points to downloading pre-compiled binaries fromhttps://github.com/Nimblesite/Deslop/releases/latest. These sources are not included in the trusted vendor or well-known service lists. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The protocol involves extensive use of shell commands to manage the environment and execute code analysis. This includes package managers (
cargo,mise,dart pub), version control (git), and language toolchains (dart,flutter). Many of these commands are executed with parameters derived from the local environment or repository structure. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests and processes code from arbitrary Dart and Flutter repositories.
- Ingestion points: The
desloptool scans the{target_dir}provided by the user or identified in the workspace. - Boundary markers: None. The skill does not implement delimiters or specific instructions to ignore embedded malicious patterns within the source code it audits.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses powerful capabilities including file system writes (refactoring), binary execution (
deslop,cargo), and Git state manipulation. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization for the data read from the repository before it influences the agent's refactoring logic.
Audit Metadata