pr-loop
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 21, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to autonomously ingest and act upon pull request review comments and CI status reports from GitHub. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where a malicious reviewer could provide crafted feedback to steer the agent's code generation or execution.
- Ingestion points: External review comments are fetched and parsed via the
triage.dartscript (referenced inSKILL.mdStep 3 and 4) and GitHub CLI commands. - Boundary markers: The skill includes a 'Critical Mindset' and 'Empirical Skepticism' protocol to verify feedback, but it lacks explicit data delimiters or 'ignore embedded instructions' markers for the ingested comment text.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities including writing to the filesystem, executing
git commit,git push, and posting comments viagh pr comment. - Sanitization: No specific sanitization or filtering of the external comment content is documented before it is passed to the agent for remediation.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes shell commands through the GitHub CLI and Dart runtime to automate the pull request lifecycle and manage background tasks.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mddefines workflows usinggh pr create,gh run watch,git push, and shell commands likekill <PID>for background process cleanup.
Audit Metadata