research
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 7, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill interpolates user-supplied research topics directly into shell commands.
- Evidence: The fallback mode executes
gemini --yolo "[research prompt]"where the prompt is derived from the user's research topic. This allows an attacker to execute arbitrary shell commands by including shell metacharacters (e.g.,;,|,`) in the research topic. - Evidence: The primary mode uses
curlto send user data to a local API:curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8005/api/search -d '{"query": "[research query]", "mode": "research"}'. Improper escaping of the[research query]variable could lead to JSON or shell injection. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill makes network requests to a local search broker.
- Evidence: Multiple
curlcommands interact withhttp://localhost:8005/api/searchandhttp://localhost:8005/api/extractto perform research and content extraction. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill demonstrates a surface for indirect prompt injection (Category 8).
- Ingestion points: The
[topic]parameter in the/researchcommand (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: Absent. User input is interpolated directly into strings without delimiters or sanitization instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute shell commands via
curl,python, and thegeminiCLI tool. - Sanitization: No evidence of input validation, escaping, or filtering for shell-sensitive characters.
Audit Metadata