janitor-swipe
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 21, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill reads from sensitive configuration paths including
~/.claude.jsonand.mcp.jsonto extract skill and server metadata, which may contain authentication details. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides shell commands for the user to execute that perform recursive directory deletion (
rm -rf) for user-scoped skills and modify core configuration files. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: By accessing and managing
~/.claude.json, the skill interacts with a file that often stores environment-specific credentials and API tokens. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions prompt the agent to deliver commands meant to be run with the
!interactive terminal prefix, which bypasses the agent's restricted tool environment. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an indirect prompt injection surface as it processes untrusted data from the
SKILL.mdfiles of all installed skills. - Ingestion points: Reads SKILL.md and directory metadata of every installed skill.
- Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or ignore-instructions are specified for the TUI display.
- Capability inventory: Filesystem deletion (
rm -rf), configuration file modification (~/.claude.json). - Sanitization: No sanitization of the skill descriptions or metadata is described before display in the TUI.
Audit Metadata