computa-please
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 21, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes potentially untrusted data from external sources during its history mining phase.
- Ingestion points: The
mine.mjsscript (vialib/opencode.mjsandlib/github.mjs) reads session history, including user messages and turns, from the local OpenCode database (~/.local/share/opencode/opencode.db) and retrieves pull request comments and commit data via the GitHub CLI. - Boundary markers: The script is documented to operate in a read-only Phase 0 mode, and output quotes extracted from external data are truncated to a maximum of 240 characters.
- Capability inventory: Across its various modules, the skill has extensive filesystem access, can execute shell commands (via
ghandplaywright-cli), and manages Git and Graphite repository states. - Sanitization: A redaction mechanism implemented in
lib/classify.mjsuses regular expressions to identify and mask sensitive information such as GitHub tokens, AWS keys, and Bearer tokens before data is written to the output failure-mode logs. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes external command-line tools to interact with repository services and perform automation.
- Evidence: The
lib/github.mjsscript usesnode:child_process.spawnto execute thegh(GitHub CLI) tool for searching pull requests and fetching API data. Additional documentation in the skill references the use ofplaywright-cliandExecutorfor browser automation and performance analysis. - Security Controls: The script constrains command arguments (such as issue IDs and pull request numbers) using regular expressions and type-casting to mitigate the potential for command injection.
Audit Metadata