create-pull-request
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
gitand the GitHub CLI (gh) to manage local repository state, analyze history, and interact with remote GitHub repositories. This includes checking authentication, rebasing branches, and pushing commits. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from the repository's commit history and pull request templates to generate the PR description. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious text in a commit message could attempt to influence the agent's output.
- Ingestion points: Reads commit history using
git log origin/main..HEADand accesses.github/pull_request_template.md(SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify explicit delimiters or 'ignore' instructions for the agent when processing commit messages for the PR body.
- Capability inventory: Uses
gitfor local repo management andghfor authenticated API operations on GitHub. - Sanitization: The skill follows security best practices by instructing the agent to write the generated PR body to a temporary file (
/tmp/pr-body.md) and using the--body-fileflag withgh pr createto prevent shell command injection from the generated content.
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