internal-comms
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill establishes a workflow where the agent reads and summarizes content from untrusted external sources, creating a significant attack surface.
- Ingestion points: Files
examples/3p-updates.md,examples/company-newsletter.md, andexamples/faq-answers.mdinstruct the agent to retrieve information from Slack messages, shared Google Drive documents, and company emails. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define any delimiters or provide guidance to the agent to distinguish between the skill's instructions and potentially malicious instructions embedded within the ingested messages or documents.
- Capability inventory: The skill is intended to operate with read access to Slack, Google Drive, Email, and Calendar tools.
- Sanitization: There are no mechanisms described to sanitize, validate, or filter content retrieved from corporate communication tools before it is processed and presented to the user.
Audit Metadata