skill-share
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data in the form of skill names and descriptions provided by the user during the initialization phase.
- Ingestion points: User-provided skill name and description used in
SKILL.mdgeneration and Slack messaging as described inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Not explicitly defined in the skill documentation to isolate user-provided content from agent instructions.
- Capability inventory: Includes file system write access (creating directories, writing markdown files), file packaging (zip), and network access (Slack API via Rube integration) across the skill development pipeline.
- Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation of user-provided content against instructional patterns is documented.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation indicates the use of Python 3.7+ scripts to automate the creation of skill structures and the validation of metadata.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: By design, the skill transmits information including skill metadata, descriptions, and direct file links to external Slack channels for team collaboration.
Audit Metadata