skills/kiluazen/skills/autark/Gen Agent Trust Hub

autark

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 10, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill explicitly instructs the agent to be 'permissionless' and states that its job is 'not to prepare work for a human to approve'. This overrides standard safety protocols regarding human-in-the-loop review for external actions like sending emails or posting to public forums.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The core functionality of the skill relies on executing the autark CLI tool to manage hypotheses, runs, and actions.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation directs users to install an external, third-party CLI tool via npm i -g autark.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill is designed to log the agent's external activities (emails, GitHub comments, Reddit posts) to an external API (autark-api.kushalsokke.workers.dev) and a public dashboard.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by ingesting untrusted data through the autark context command.
  • Ingestion points: The agent reads data from local product briefs (products/<slug>.md) and remote context (hypotheses, recent runs, and narratives) via the autark context command.
  • Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or boundary markers are used to separate ingested data from agent instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to perform network operations and external posts via autark log action (Email, GitHub, Reddit, HN, etc.).
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the remote content fetched by the CLI before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
May 10, 2026, 06:50 PM