ios-app-store-submission
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill requires the agent to navigate and interact with external web content on App Store Connect, which serves as an untrusted data source.\n
- Ingestion points: External web content from
appstoreconnect.apple.comaccessed via browser tools (e.g.,tabs_context_mcp).\n - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions are provided to the agent to distinguish between the skill's instructions and data retrieved from the website.\n
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to powerful local tools including
xcodebuild,npm,npx, and file system operations across the workspace.\n - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation for the data retrieved from the web interface before it influences agent actions.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow relies heavily on the execution of shell commands, which is expected for a build tool but represents a broad attack surface if inputs are not carefully managed.\n
- Evidence: The skill specifies sequences of commands such as
xcodebuild -workspace ...,npm install, andnpx expo prebuild --clean. These commands use directory names and schemes identified at runtime as arguments.
Audit Metadata