agent-teams-playbook
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements a multi-agent workflow where a coordinator and sub-agents ingest task descriptions and research findings, creating a potential surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The agent processes user-provided task descriptions and reads from files like
findings.mdduring the discovery and execution stages. - Boundary markers: The instructions suggest using "bounded tasks" in Codex profiles, but the logic does not enforce strict structural delimiters or escaping for interpolated external data.
- Capability inventory: The skill is authorized to spawn sub-agents (
runtime:spawn-agents) and perform filesystem writes (filesystem:write-planning-artifacts), which could be misused if malicious instructions are ingested. - Sanitization: There are no explicit sanitization or filtering mechanisms defined in the prompt instructions to handle potentially adversarial content in the input tasks.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The project includes a shell installation script and a Python test suite that executes local commands.
- Evidence:
scripts/install.shperforms directory management, file copying, and validation using standard POSIX utilities. - Evidence:
tests/test_installer.pyutilizessubprocess.runto verify the installation script's behavior within isolated temporary directories. - Note: These actions are standard for software distribution and automated testing and do not show signs of malicious intent.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The installation utility allows for fetching skill components from a remote source.
- Evidence:
scripts/install.shcan downloadSKILL.mdandREADME.mdfrom the author's public GitHub repository athttps://raw.githubusercontent.com/KimYx0207/Kim_Service/main/when the--from-githubflag is used.
Audit Metadata