anndata
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 17, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The
SKILL.mdfile contains multiple instructions to installanndata==0.12.16usinguv pip install. As of late 2024, the stable release cycle foranndatais in the 0.11.x range. The skill claims this version was released in May 2026, making it a futuristic and unverifiable dependency. Installing specific unreleased versions from public registries is a known vector for dependency hijacking. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill frequently uses the
uvtool to execute shell commands for environment management and package installation. This reliance on shell-level operations increases the risk of command injection if parameters like package versions or paths are compromised. - [METADATA_POISONING]: There is a mismatch between the provided author context ('kinandigital') and the metadata field in
SKILL.md('K-Dense Inc.'). While not an direct attack, this inconsistency can be used to mask the true origin of the skill. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]:
- Ingestion points: The skill provides extensive methods for reading external data from H5AD, Zarr, CSV, MTX, Loom, and Excel files via
ad.read_h5ad,ad.read_zarr, and variousanndata.iohelpers. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit boundary markers or system instructions to ignore potential natural language commands embedded within the data matrices or metadata.
- Capability inventory: The agent is granted
Bash,Write, andEdittools, which could be leveraged by a malicious payload embedded in a scientific dataset to perform unauthorized file or network operations. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of data validation or sanitization for the content of processed files, although a basic HTTPS/host check is shown as a template for remote downloads in
references/io_operations.md.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata