docx
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 17, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/office/soffice.pydynamically generates C source code at runtime, writes it to a file, and invokesgccto compile it into a shared object library. This library is then injected into the execution environment of thesofficeprocess using theLD_PRELOADenvironment variable to intercept system-level socket calls. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill extensively uses the
subprocessmodule to execute external binaries and system tools. Key findings include: scripts/office/soffice.pyexecutesgccfor binary compilation andsoffice(LibreOffice) for document processing.scripts/accept_changes.pyexecutessofficewith headless flags and custom installation environments to apply document macros.scripts/office/validators/redlining.pyexecutesgitto perform word-level comparisons between document versions.- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a broad attack surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting and processing untrusted document files.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/office/unpack.pyandscripts/office/validate.pyextract and analyze XML content from user-provided.docxfiles. - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not employ specific delimiters or instruction-ignore markers when processing external document text.
- Capability inventory: The skill environment provides high-privilege capabilities including binary compilation, process injection, and shell access to tools like
pandocandsoffice. - Sanitization: While the skill uses
defusedxmlto mitigate XML-specific vulnerabilities, it does not demonstrate sanitization of document content before passing it to system utilities.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata