scientific-slides
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests user-supplied text descriptions to generate slides and schematics using remote LLMs. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where maliciously crafted slide content could attempt to influence the agent's output.
- Ingestion points: User-provided prompts in
scripts/generate_slide_image_ai.pyandscripts/generate_schematic_ai.py. - Boundary markers: The scripts wrap user input with specific design guidelines and 'USER REQUEST' delimiters to minimize accidental instruction following.
- Capability inventory: Uses subprocess calls to internal helper scripts and makes network requests via
requests.post. - Sanitization: Relies on the security guardrails of the underlying LLM provider (e.g., Google Gemini models via OpenRouter).
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Several scripts use
subprocess.runto orchestrate local tools and helper scripts. - Evidence:
scripts/generate_schematic.pyandscripts/generate_slide_image.pyexecute internal AI scripts using list-based argument passing, which avoids shell injection vulnerabilities.scripts/validate_presentation.pycallspdflatexwith the-no-shell-escapeflag enabled to prevent arbitrary command execution through LaTeX. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill makes network requests to external APIs to facilitate its core AI-powered features.
- Evidence:
scripts/generate_slide_image_ai.pyandscripts/generate_schematic_ai.pyperform POST requests tohttps://openrouter.ai/api/v1/chat/completions. OpenRouter is recognized as a well-known service aggregator for AI models.
Audit Metadata