find-linkedin-contacts
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from external sources, specifically job posting URLs and company websites, to guide the agent's workflow.
- Ingestion points: Step 1 (
[job-url]) and Step 2 ([company-domain]) inSKILL.mdutilizecurland Jina Reader to fetch external content. - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no instructions provided to the agent to differentiate between its own instructions and content fetched from external sources.
- Capability inventory: The agent is equipped with browser automation tools (
mcp__claude-in-chrome__*), shell command execution (curl), andWebSearchcapabilities. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation logic is specified for the fetched content before it is processed for contact extraction.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions for shell commands where parameters are interpolated from potentially untrusted variables.
- Evidence: In
SKILL.mdStep 2, the commandcurl -sL "https://[company-domain]/team"incorporates the[company-domain]variable. If this variable, extracted from user input or other external sources, contains shell metacharacters, it could lead to unintended command execution.
Audit Metadata