Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted PDF files to extract text and form structures, creating an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: PDF data is ingested via
scripts/extract_form_field_info.py,scripts/extract_form_structure.py, and libraries likepdfplumberandpypdfas described inSKILL.mdandFORMS.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or warnings to ignore embedded instructions within the processed PDF content.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for file writing via
scripts/fill_fillable_fields.pyand executing shell commands for PDF manipulation and image processing likeqpdf,pdftotext,pdftk, andmagickas outlined inSKILL.mdandFORMS.md. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation of the extracted PDF content is performed before it is used to drive further agent actions.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on several command-line utilities for PDF processing, such as
pdftotext,qpdf,pdftk, andmagick. These tools are executed using arguments often derived from the analysis of external PDF documents. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
OCR_AND_CONVERSION.mdfile specifies that theeasyocrlibrary downloads required language models upon initial execution. This is a standard and documented feature of the library used for its multi-language support.
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