project-template

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 18, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-supplied input through the $ARGUMENTS variable to determine project structure and execution flow without sanitization.
  • Ingestion points: $ARGUMENTS variable in SKILL.md frontmatter and body.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. No instructions are provided to the agent to validate or escape the input before using it in directory creation or verification steps.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write files, initialize git repositories, and execute build/lint commands (subprocess calls).
  • Sanitization: Absent. A malicious project name or type could lead to command injection if the agent interpolates the input directly into shell commands during the scaffolding or verification process.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill generates .claude/settings.json configuration files that include automated shell hooks (PostToolUse and Stop) designed to execute on every file write.
  • Evidence: The Python and Next.js templates generate hooks that run shell pipelines (e.g., python3 -c, ruff, npx biome) whenever a file is edited.
  • Context: While intended for auto-formatting, this establishes a mechanism for persistent, automated command execution within the local development environment.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill explicitly instructs the agent to run build and lint verification steps that involve external package managers and toolchains.
  • Evidence: Execution Step 7 in SKILL.md requires the agent to "check that the project builds/lints after scaffolding."
  • Context: This results in the execution of commands like npm run build, uv run python, and flutter run, which download and execute code from remote registries (npm, PyPI, etc.).
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Apr 18, 2026, 12:08 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — project-template