qwen-dispatch
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 21, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions utilize custom command-line utilities
qwen-dispatchandqwen-escalateto facilitate task execution and model routing. These tools interface with both local (Ollama) and cloud (Qwen OAuth) backends and manage state within the user's home directory under~/.qwen/. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill defines a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection by processing untrusted user input within a context that has extensive system capabilities.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted user descriptions are ingested via positional arguments in the
qwen-dispatch,qwen-escalate,think,plan, andautocommands. - Boundary markers: The skill definition lacks explicit boundary markers or instructions to the models to disregard directives embedded within the processed data.
- Capability inventory: According to the routing decision matrix, the system has access to a wide array of Model Context Protocol (MCP) tools, including
filesystem,github,postgres,docker,kubernetes, andterraform. This provides the potential for unauthorized file modifications, infrastructure changes, or data access if an injection is successful. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, filtering, or validation of the user-provided prompts before they are interpolated into the model workflow.
Audit Metadata