recall
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 21, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides bash command templates for searching history files using
grep. Specifically, the instructiongrep -l "<search_term>" ~/.claude/projects/*/history.jsonlinterpolates a user-supplied search term directly into a shell command. This creates a surface for command injection if a user provides a query containing shell metacharacters (e.g.,;,|, or backticks) to break out of the quoted string and execute arbitrary commands. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill explicitly targets sensitive application directories, specifically
~/.claude/projects/, to readhistory.jsonlandMEMORY.md. These files contain raw, unencrypted transcripts of all previous user interactions and extracted facts, which constitutes an exposure of private conversation data and session metadata. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted data from past conversation logs, creating a vulnerability to indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Conversation transcripts stored in
history.jsonland structured memory inMEMORY.mdlocated within the~/.claude/projects/path. - Boundary markers: The skill instructions do not specify any delimiters or safety markers to prevent the agent from following instructions that may be embedded within the recalled historical data.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes shell commands (
find,grep) and general file read capabilities to process the data. - Sanitization: There is no mechanism described for sanitizing or escaping the recalled content before it is re-integrated into the agent's active context.
Audit Metadata