sim-studio
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 21, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill contains a hardcoded database connection string with a plaintext password:
postgresql://postgres:simstudio_local_2026@localhost:5433/simstudio. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides numerous commands to manage local infrastructure using
docker compose, including starting/stopping containers and accessing logs at~/Projects/sim/. It also usescurlto interact with an Admin API using a key stored in a local.envfile. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to configure Claude Code to use
npx -y mcp-remote, which dynamically downloads and executes code from the npm registry to connect to the local Sim Studio instance. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill documents several automation patterns that create an attack surface for indirect prompt injection:
- Ingestion points: Processes external data via 'Web Search', 'Content Extract', and 'File Upload' nodes in visual workflows (SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: No instructions are provided to the agent to treat external content as untrusted or to use delimiters to prevent instruction injection.
- Capability inventory: Workflows have the ability to write to databases, perform network requests via webhooks, and execute transformations (SKILL.md).
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation or sanitization before external data is passed to LLM providers within the workflows.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata