unified-router
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 21, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill invokes
qwen-dispatchandqwen-escalatevia the shell to handle task routing. These commands include user-provided task strings and directory paths (--cwd). - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill relies on an external Python script
auto-activate.pyand custom tools (qwen-dispatch,qwen-escalate) that are not included in the skill distribution or standard environments. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill interacts with sensitive metadata and history files located in
~/.claude/projects/*/memory/and~/.qwen/(thinking, plans, logs, metrics). This provides access to the internal state and interaction history of the agents. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill functions as a gateway for tasks, creating an attack surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious input could affect routing logic or downstream execution.
- Ingestion points: Task inputs processed during planning and execution stages in CoreMind.
- Boundary markers: Absent; no delimiters or ignore-instructions are specified for the routed content.
- Capability inventory: Shell command execution and file system access to agent-specific directories.
- Sanitization: Absent; the routing algorithm does not specify filtering or validation of task content.
Audit Metadata