unified-router

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 21, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill invokes qwen-dispatch and qwen-escalate via the shell to handle task routing. These commands include user-provided task strings and directory paths (--cwd).
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill relies on an external Python script auto-activate.py and custom tools (qwen-dispatch, qwen-escalate) that are not included in the skill distribution or standard environments.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill interacts with sensitive metadata and history files located in ~/.claude/projects/*/memory/ and ~/.qwen/ (thinking, plans, logs, metrics). This provides access to the internal state and interaction history of the agents.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill functions as a gateway for tasks, creating an attack surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious input could affect routing logic or downstream execution.
  • Ingestion points: Task inputs processed during planning and execution stages in CoreMind.
  • Boundary markers: Absent; no delimiters or ignore-instructions are specified for the routed content.
  • Capability inventory: Shell command execution and file system access to agent-specific directories.
  • Sanitization: Absent; the routing algorithm does not specify filtering or validation of task content.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 21, 2026, 05:05 PM