agents-md
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 20, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The invocation script
scripts/invoke.pydynamically locates its management engine by searching through a hardcoded list of over 60 paths in the user's home directory, targeting configuration folders for various AI agent tools (e.g.,~/.claude/skills,~/.cursor/skills,~/.roo/skills). The path to the executable script (kntnt.py) is computed at runtime based on these environment-specific locations. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
subprocess.runto execute the discovered engine viauv run. This execution of code found through broad directory traversal poses a risk if a malicious script is placed in one of the searched locations. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest data from diverse project files and synthesize them into always-loaded agent instructions, creating a vulnerability to indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Reads content from
CLAUDE.md,AGENTS.md,agents.d/,docs/,README*, andSKILL.mdfiles in the current repository. - Boundary markers: While the skill uses logic 'gates' to filter facts, it lacks cryptographic or clear structural delimiters to isolate untrusted project content from the instruction generation process.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to modify project-level configuration files (
CLAUDE.md,AGENTS.md) and execute shell commands via its initialization scripts. - Sanitization: The processing logic focuses on fact utility and stability rather than sanitizing inputs for potential malicious prompt sequences.
Audit Metadata