delegation
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill explicitly instructs the agent to run
scripts/invoke.pyand adopt the output as standing instructions for the session, which is the primary mechanism for switching to delegation mode. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/invoke.pywrapper dynamically searches for a central management engine (kntnt.py) by iterating through a pre-defined list of standard AI agent skill directories in the user's home folder, executing it viasubprocess.run. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill takes verbatim user input following the
/delegationcommand and passes it to the external management engine via stdin, creating a risk that malicious input could influence the instructions returned to the agent. 1. Ingestion points: The natural language instructions following the command separator inSKILL.md. 2. Boundary markers: No delimiters or ignore instructions are applied to the user input before processing. 3. Capability inventory: Use ofsubprocess.runinscripts/invoke.pyand instructions inSKILL.mdfor the agent to follow the resulting output. 4. Sanitization: The provided implementation does not include validation or sanitization of the passed user input.
Audit Metadata