delegation
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 30, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONPERSISTENCEDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/invoke.pyusessubprocess.runto execute an external manager engine found on the local filesystem. This engine receives user-supplied input via stdin. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically identifies its execution engine by scanning a extensive list of potential hidden directories in the user's home folder (e.g.,
~/.cursor/skills,~/.claude/skills,~/.aider-desk/skills), which is a technique that could be misused if malicious files are placed in these locations. - [PERSISTENCE]: The skill is designed to modify persistent environment configuration files, including
AGENTS.mdand harness-specific global context files like~/.claude/CLAUDE.md, to inject "standing instructions" and pointer blocks that remain active across agent sessions. - [DATA_EXPOSURE]: Instructions in
references/mode.mddirect the agent to read sensitive session log files and JSONL metadata located in~/.claude/projects/to determine current permission settings. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a vulnerable surface where untrusted data enters the agent context via
sys.stdininscripts/invoke.py. Although a boundary separator (--) is mentioned inhelp.md, the input is passed verbatim to asubprocess.runcall without visible sanitization or filtering of the external content.
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