postmark
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 28, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/invoke.pyusessubprocess.runto call a local management engine. This is a standard architectural component for this vendor to integrate the skill with the agent harness. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data retrieved from the Postmark API, such as message bodies and templates, which could contain malicious instructions. Ingestion points: Data from API responses in
scripts/postmark.pyis rendered into the agent's context. Boundary markers: TheSKILL.mdfile provides explicit instructions for the agent to treat Postmark data as inert information and never as instructions. Capability inventory: The skill has network access (urllib.requestinscripts/postmark.py) and local script execution capabilities. Sanitization: The skill relies on the LLM's adherence to prompt-based guardrails to prevent data from being interpreted as instructions. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill manages sensitive API tokens stored at
~/.kntnt/postmark/credentials.json. While this is a sensitive file path, the skill implements security best practices by enforcing0600permissions and using a clipboard-based setup to avoid exposing tokens in the conversation history.
Audit Metadata