proofread
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 23, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/invoke.pydynamically identifies an execution engine (kntnt.py) by searching through a pre-defined list of global skill directories, such as~/.claude/skills,~/.config/goose/skills, and~/.cursor/skills. Once a valid manager directory is found, it executes the engine usingsubprocess.run. This runtime resolution of executable paths from potentially user-writable locations is a security concern. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill invokes local Python scripts using
uv run. Specifically,SKILL.mdinstructs the agent to runscripts/invoke.py, which in turn spawns a subprocess to run the discoveredkntntengine. The skill also executesscripts/languages.pyfrom an external library path. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill is designed to accept a URL as an input operand. The agent will fetch content from the provided URL to perform proofreading tasks.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The skill ingests untrusted data from inline text, local files, and remote URLs (identified in
SKILL.mdandhelp.md). - Boundary markers: While the skill instructs the agent to treat code blocks as "quoted material" and not modify them, it lacks explicit delimiters or "ignore instructions" markers for the primary text artifact being processed.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for subprocess execution (
scripts/invoke.py), file writing (via the--in-placeoption), and network reading (via the URL operand). - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation of the ingested content is performed before processing.
Audit Metadata