ready-for-agent-check
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/invoke.pydynamically identifies the path to an execution engine (kntnt.py) by searching through a pre-defined list of potential global skill directories associated with various AI agent harnesses (e.g.,~/.claude/skills,~/.cursor/skills). It then executes this engine usinguv run, which constitutes dynamic code execution from computed paths. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill retrieves ticket bodies and comments from an external tracker (GitHub) and injects them into subagent prompts via the
references/review.mdtemplate. This untrusted content is not sanitized, creating a vulnerability where a malicious ticket could influence subagent behavior. 1. Ingestion points: GitHub ticket content (body and comments) read in Step 2 ofSKILL.md. 2. Boundary markers: The prompt uses Markdown headers but lacks explicit 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings for the subagent. 3. Capability inventory: The skill usesghanduv, and subagents are tasked with repository analysis;scripts/invoke.pyusessubprocess.run. 4. Sanitization: No escaping or validation is performed on the ingested ticket data. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/invoke.pyfile uses thesubprocess.runfunction to execute system commands (uv run). While it uses an argument list rather than a shell string, it enables the execution of the found manager tool and passes user-provided input throughstdin.
Audit Metadata