skills/kntnt/skills/redline/Gen Agent Trust Hub

redline

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 20, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted input in the form of text, files, or URLs which are then used to generate prompts for subagents.
  • Ingestion points: Step 1 of SKILL.md identifies the Text Artifact (inline text, local path, or URL) as the primary input.
  • Boundary markers: The correction brief in references/correction.md wraps content in <text> and <findings> tags and instructs subagents to only modify what the findings concern. SKILL.md Step 6 specifically excludes code blocks from the review process.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to read local files and external URLs, perform in-place file edits, and execute local Python scripts via the uv tool.
  • Sanitization: Step 6 of SKILL.md mandates that fenced blocks and inline code be treated as quoted material, preventing instructions within them from affecting the agent's behavior.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local scripts to perform its logic.
  • It runs scripts/invoke.py using uv run, passing raw user input to the backend engine via stdin.
  • It invokes languages.py from the collection library to resolve editorial resources.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The scripts/invoke.py script searches for a vendor-provided engine (kntnt.py) at runtime by scanning a predefined list of common agent skill directories within the user's home directory.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill allows for the retrieval of content from arbitrary URLs provided as input for the purpose of editorial review.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 20, 2026, 07:35 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — redline