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Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted input in the form of text, files, or URLs which are then used to generate prompts for subagents.
- Ingestion points: Step 1 of
SKILL.mdidentifies the Text Artifact (inline text, local path, or URL) as the primary input. - Boundary markers: The correction brief in
references/correction.mdwraps content in<text>and<findings>tags and instructs subagents to only modify what the findings concern.SKILL.mdStep 6 specifically excludes code blocks from the review process. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to read local files and external URLs, perform in-place file edits, and execute local Python scripts via the
uvtool. - Sanitization: Step 6 of
SKILL.mdmandates that fenced blocks and inline code be treated as quoted material, preventing instructions within them from affecting the agent's behavior. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local scripts to perform its logic.
- It runs
scripts/invoke.pyusinguv run, passing raw user input to the backend engine via stdin. - It invokes
languages.pyfrom the collection library to resolve editorial resources. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/invoke.pyscript searches for a vendor-provided engine (kntnt.py) at runtime by scanning a predefined list of common agent skill directories within the user's home directory. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill allows for the retrieval of content from arbitrary URLs provided as input for the purpose of editorial review.
Audit Metadata