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Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/invoke.pyscript executes an external engine (kntnt.py) usingsubprocess.run. Additionally, the skill's instructions and subagent prompts (references/correction.md) include commands to run helper scripts such aslanguages.pyandarticle_anatomy.pyusing theuvtool. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill implements a discovery mechanism in
scripts/invoke.pythat searches for the vendor's "Manager" engine across a wide range of global directory paths (e.g.,~/.claude/skills,~/.cursor/skills). The path to the executable script is computed at runtime based on the local filesystem state. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process text artifacts from arbitrary sources, including external URLs via the
--briefand operand arguments. This content is subsequently passed to subagents for analysis and repair, creating a surface where malicious instructions embedded in the source text could potentially influence the behavior of the subagents or the main agent. - Ingestion points: Text artifacts and Writing Briefs can be fetched from user-supplied URLs.
- Boundary markers: The subagent prompt in
references/correction.mduses<text>delimiters to encapsulate the artifact, but lacks explicit instructions to the subagent to ignore potentially malicious content within that text. - Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute shell commands via
uv, spawn subagents, and invoke other skills (proofread). - Sanitization: The skill does not describe any specific sanitization or filtering of the input text before it is processed by subagents or scripts.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill relies on the
uvtool to execute its scripts. Depending on the environment state,uvmay attempt to fetch Python interpreters or manage dependencies from external registries.
Audit Metadata