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Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 1, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/invoke.pyscript dynamically locates and executes an external engine (kntnt.py) by searching through a large predefined list of potential installation paths in the user's home directory (e.g.,~/.claude/skills/kntnt/,~/.cursor/skills/kntnt/). This results in the execution of code from paths determined at runtime based on the local environment. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
uv runandsubprocess.runto execute various local Python scripts, including the discovered engine and helper scripts likelanguages.pyandarticle_anatomy.py. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process arbitrary external content from URLs and local files provided in a 'brief'. While it implements a sophisticated defense mechanism by using a dedicated subagent to verify source fidelity and check for discrepancies, the ingestion of untrusted external data represents a significant attack surface.
- Ingestion points: The
<brief>argument inSKILL.mdcan contain text, local file paths, and URLs which are gathered in Step 2 of the workflow. - Boundary markers: The
references/source-check.mdfile defines a specific prompt for the checker subagent that uses block quotes and clear instructions to treat the provided material as data for comparison rather than instructions. - Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands via
uv run, perform network requests to fetch URLs, and spawn subagents. - Sanitization: The skill relies on a 'Source and quotation comparison' process performed by a fresh subagent to validate the draft against the original material before delivery.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill is instructed to gather material from URLs provided in the user's brief, leading to the retrieval of remote content during the drafting process.
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