dns-migration-utility
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by ingesting and processing untrusted DNS configuration files (AdGuard, Pi-hole, Bind9). While the scripts primarily perform data extraction and normalization, a malicious configuration file could contain domain names or TXT record values designed to influence the agent's behavior if those values are later interpolated into a prompt or displayed to a user without proper sanitization.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/migrate_dns.pyreads data from files provided via the--source-fileargument using various adapters (AdGuardAdapter,PiholeAdapter,BindAdapter,GenericAdapter). - Boundary markers: Absent. The script does not use specific delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the DNS records.
- Capability inventory: The script performs file reads (
open()) and network operations (API calls to a user-specified Technitium DNS server via thetechnitium_dns_mcplibrary). - Sanitization: Basic regex validation is performed for Bind9 records (
a_record_pattern), and domains are checked for zone-scope membership, but there is no explicit sanitization for potential prompt injection content in the record fields (e.g., domain names or record values).
Audit Metadata