convention

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 14, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to its core function of analyzing and extracting patterns from untrusted source code.
  • Ingestion points: The skill reads all project source files matching specific layer patterns in Phase 2 (P2), existing rule files in Phase 7 (P7), and the project's CLAUDE.md in Phase 7.5.
  • Boundary markers: The prompts for subagents (Explore, Plan, Writer agents) do not include explicit instructions to ignore embedded commands or use unique delimiters to separate instructions from the analyzed code content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill and its subagents have access to Read, Write, Edit, Bash, Agent, and Skill tools, which could be abused if an injection is successful.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or filtering of the extracted content is performed before it is processed or written to convention documents and rules.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local shell scripts to perform project discovery, stack detection, and environment setup.
  • Evidence: Execution of scripts/convention.sh with subcommands such as detect-stack, scan, setup, and validate via the Bash tool.
  • Context: These commands are used for legitimate project scanning and setup tasks within the plugin's own directory structure.
  • [SAFE]: The skill utilizes vendor-specific subagents and documentation resources authored by the vendor.
  • Evidence: Integration with brewtools:text-optimizer, brewcode:bc-rules-organizer, and references to doc-claude.brewcode.app.
  • Context: These are internal components of the brewcode ecosystem by kochetkov-ma and represent expected vendor functionality.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 14, 2026, 06:23 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — convention