convention
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to its core function of analyzing and extracting patterns from untrusted source code.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads all project source files matching specific layer patterns in Phase 2 (P2), existing rule files in Phase 7 (P7), and the project's
CLAUDE.mdin Phase 7.5. - Boundary markers: The prompts for subagents (Explore, Plan, Writer agents) do not include explicit instructions to ignore embedded commands or use unique delimiters to separate instructions from the analyzed code content.
- Capability inventory: The skill and its subagents have access to
Read,Write,Edit,Bash,Agent, andSkilltools, which could be abused if an injection is successful. - Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or filtering of the extracted content is performed before it is processed or written to convention documents and rules.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local shell scripts to perform project discovery, stack detection, and environment setup.
- Evidence: Execution of
scripts/convention.shwith subcommands such asdetect-stack,scan,setup, andvalidatevia the Bash tool. - Context: These commands are used for legitimate project scanning and setup tasks within the plugin's own directory structure.
- [SAFE]: The skill utilizes vendor-specific subagents and documentation resources authored by the vendor.
- Evidence: Integration with
brewtools:text-optimizer,brewcode:bc-rules-organizer, and references todoc-claude.brewcode.app. - Context: These are internal components of the brewcode ecosystem by
kochetkov-maand represent expected vendor functionality.
Audit Metadata