my-claude
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses potentially sensitive local files and directories to generate environment documentation.
- Evidence: The internal mode scans global configuration at
~/.claude/CLAUDE.md, global rules in~/.claude/rules/, and agent definitions in~/.claude/agents/. - Evidence: The skill explicitly reads user memory files located at
~/.claude/projects/**/memory/MEMORY.md, which may contain private interaction history or project secrets. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell commands to extract metadata from the local filesystem during its initialization.
- Evidence: It executes a
nodescript viaBashto parseplugin.jsonfor version information:node -e "process.stdout.write(JSON.parse(require('fs').readFileSync(process.argv[1],'utf8')).version||'')" "$PJ". - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from the web and local user files, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context via
WebSearchandWebFetch(targeting sites like Reddit, GitHub, and forums) and through local user-editable files likeCLAUDE.md. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions for the sub-agents to ignore or sanitize embedded instructions within the ingested data.
- Capability inventory: The skill has
Writeaccess to the project directory andBashexecution capabilities, which could be abused if an injection is successful. - Sanitization: The skill lacks logic to escape or validate external content before aggregating it into the final document.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches data from various external sources to synthesize its research reports.
- Evidence: It performs web research using the
general-purposeagent, accessing domains likegithub.com,reddit.com, and official documentation sites.
Audit Metadata