ssh
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 14, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXPOSURE_AND_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses highly sensitive files in the user's home directory, including SSH private keys (
~/.ssh/id_*) and the SSH configuration file (~/.ssh/config). This information is gathered during environment checks and server setup to facilitate remote connections. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically generates and writes a new AI agent configuration file (
.claude/agents/ssh-admin.md) at runtime. This file is constructed from a template and populated with server inventory data, creating a new executable context for sub-tasks. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides the ability to execute arbitrary shell commands on remote servers via SSH. Although it implements a command classification system and requires user confirmation for destructive or privileged actions, the core functionality enables remote command execution.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an indirect prompt injection surface by ingesting data from remote servers through the
server-discover.shscript. - Ingestion points: The output of remote commands (such as OS details, Docker information, and service lists) is read and stored in local configuration files (
CLAUDE.local.md) and used in generated agent prompts. - Boundary markers: The skill does not use explicit boundary markers or delimiters when interpolating remote command output into instructions, which could allow malicious server responses to influence the agent's behavior.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to
Bash,Agent,Write, andEdittools, allowing it to modify local files or spawn sub-agents based on the ingested data. - Sanitization: Sanitization is limited to basic character removal (e.g., using
trorsed), which may not prevent complex payload injection from a compromised or malicious remote server.
Audit Metadata