text-human
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
Bashtool to execute shell commands for environment analysis and file discovery. These commands include user-provided parameters such as file paths and git commit hashes. - Evidence:
SKILL.md(Phase 0.5) executesgit status --porcelain -- <resolved paths>andreference/flows/mixed.mdexecutesgit diff --name-only <hash>^..<hash>and a complexfindcommand. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes potentially untrusted data from external files (e.g., source code, documentation, and chat logs), which presents an attack surface where embedded instructions could attempt to influence the agent's behavior during the 'humanization' process.
- Evidence Chain:
- Ingestion points: The skill uses the
Readtool to load content from user-specified files or git commits. - Boundary markers: The prompts for sub-agents (defined in
reference/flows/mixed.md) do not use robust delimiters to isolate file content from the task instructions. - Capability inventory: The skill and its sub-agents have access to sensitive tools including
Write,Edit,Bash, andAgent(viaTask). - Sanitization: The skill includes a 'PASS 1 STRIP' phase (documented in
reference/ai-patterns.md) designed to remove AI self-references and prompt residue from the input text. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically generates tasks for sub-agents using the
Agenttool. These tasks are constructed by interpolating system templates with user-provided custom instructions and environment variables. - Evidence: In
reference/flows/mixed.md, theTaskprompt is built by concatenating raw[CUSTOM_INSTRUCTIONS_IF_ANY]and expanding the${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}variable.
Audit Metadata