obsidian-vault-add

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 11, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses user-supplied input (the <title> argument) directly in shell commands such as obsidian read file="<title>" and obsidian create path="<path>". This creates a risk of command injection if the input contains shell metacharacters like semicolons, pipes, or backticks.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill generates Python code at runtime by inserting user input and web-fetched metadata into script templates (e.g., query = "<title>"). Since these strings are then executed via Bash(python3*), an attacker could potentially execute arbitrary Python code by providing a title that escapes the string literal and includes malicious commands.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches metadata and images from several external services, including Wikipedia, the Apple iTunes API, TVMaze, and OpenLibrary. While these are well-known services, the downloaded content is used to populate vault notes and script variables without integrity checks.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill demonstrates a surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting untrusted data from web search results and public APIs and interpolating it into the vault context.
  • Ingestion points: Metadata and descriptions are fetched from the Wikipedia REST API, iTunes Search API, TVMaze API, and OpenLibrary API.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not use delimiters or instructions to ignore potential commands embedded within the fetched metadata.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has broad capabilities including file modification (Edit, Write), shell command execution (Bash), and Python execution (python3).
  • Sanitization: Absent. There is no evidence of escaping or validating external content before it is added to notes or executed in scripts.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Apr 11, 2026, 02:15 PM