pdca-cycle

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 19, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The shell script provided for saving artifacts in SKILL.md uses an unquoted heredoc delimiter, which is a significant security risk when handling variable data.
  • Evidence: cat > "$ARTIFACT_FILE" <<EOFJSON in the post-protocol section of SKILL.md.
  • Description: Using <<EOFJSON (unquoted) instead of <<'EOFJSON' allows the shell to perform variable expansion and command substitution ($(...)) on the content before writing. If the agent populates the JSON template with untrusted user input containing shell payloads, those payloads will be executed by the Bash tool.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill automatically collects project and environment metadata using Git commands.
  • Evidence: PROJECT_ROOT=$(git rev-parse --show-toplevel), BRANCH=$(git branch --show-current), and COMMIT=$(git rev-parse --short HEAD) in SKILL.md.
  • Description: The skill extracts project structure and version control history. While this is used for local artifact logging, the automated discovery of environment details is a common prerequisite for data exfiltration.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill demonstrates a high-risk surface for indirect prompt injection by processing and storing untrusted user requests in a structured format without sanitization.
  • Ingestion points: The user_request field within the artifact generation script in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: None; untrusted data is directly interpolated into a JSON structure processed by a shell script.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to powerful tools including Bash, Write, Edit, and Glob.
  • Sanitization: None; there are no instructions for escaping or validating external content before it is stored or processed.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Apr 19, 2026, 10:00 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — pdca-cycle