pdca-cycle
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 19, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The shell script provided for saving artifacts in SKILL.md uses an unquoted heredoc delimiter, which is a significant security risk when handling variable data.
- Evidence:
cat > "$ARTIFACT_FILE" <<EOFJSONin the post-protocol section of SKILL.md. - Description: Using
<<EOFJSON(unquoted) instead of<<'EOFJSON'allows the shell to perform variable expansion and command substitution ($(...)) on the content before writing. If the agent populates the JSON template with untrusted user input containing shell payloads, those payloads will be executed by the Bash tool. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill automatically collects project and environment metadata using Git commands.
- Evidence:
PROJECT_ROOT=$(git rev-parse --show-toplevel),BRANCH=$(git branch --show-current), andCOMMIT=$(git rev-parse --short HEAD)in SKILL.md. - Description: The skill extracts project structure and version control history. While this is used for local artifact logging, the automated discovery of environment details is a common prerequisite for data exfiltration.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill demonstrates a high-risk surface for indirect prompt injection by processing and storing untrusted user requests in a structured format without sanitization.
- Ingestion points: The
user_requestfield within the artifact generation script in SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: None; untrusted data is directly interpolated into a JSON structure processed by a shell script.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to powerful tools including
Bash,Write,Edit, andGlob. - Sanitization: None; there are no instructions for escaping or validating external content before it is stored or processed.
Audit Metadata