skills/konglong87/superpm/pm-feedback/Gen Agent Trust Hub

pm-feedback

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 3, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's preamble section executes a shell script located at a computed path relative to the skill directory: bash "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/../../check-update.sh".
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted user feedback data, which is passed directly to multiple sub-agents without proper isolation or sanitization.
  • Ingestion points: User feedback is collected via file reads, direct text input, or web scraping using tools like mcp__exa__web_search_exa and mcp__exa__web_fetch_exa in Step 1.
  • Boundary markers: The Subagent Prompt Templates (e.g., for Feedback Categorization, Sentiment Analysis) do not implement delimiters or 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings for the data labeled as '[反馈数据]' (feedback data).
  • Capability inventory: The primary agent and its sub-agents have access to sensitive tools including Bash, Write, and Agent (sub-agent delegation).
  • Sanitization: There is no logic present to sanitize, escape, or validate the content of the external feedback before it is interpolated into agent prompts.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill incorporates external data retrieval capabilities via WebSearch and Exa tools to crawl application stores and social media for user reviews.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Aug 3, 2026, 06:20 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — pm-feedback