skills/konglong87/superpm/pm-roadmap/Gen Agent Trust Hub

pm-roadmap

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 3, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's preamble executes a shell script located at a relative path outside the immediate skill directory (../../check-update.sh). This behavior occurs automatically when the skill is initialized, which could lead to unintended execution if the environment or the target script is compromised.
  • Evidence found in SKILL.md under the Preamble section:
  • bash "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/../../check-update.sh" 2>/dev/null || true
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection. It collects free-text input from users (e.g., product vision, strategic goals) and interpolates this data directly into a markdown document using the Write tool without sanitization or boundary markers.
  • Ingestion points: User input via AskUserQuestion at Steps 1 through 4.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. Data is interpolated directly into templates (e.g., {VISION}).
  • Capability inventory: The agent has access to Bash, Write, and Read tools.
  • Sanitization: None detected. Malicious instructions embedded in user-provided vision or goal descriptions could influence downstream tasks when the generated 产品路线图.md is later read by the agent or other skills.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: While no remote URLs are directly downloaded or piped to a shell, the execution of the local check-update.sh script represents a risk of local code execution that depends on the integrity of the surrounding file system structure.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Aug 3, 2026, 06:20 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — pm-roadmap