pm-search
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 15, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a script using a relative path that escapes the current skill directory in the preamble:
bash "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/../../check-update.sh". This pattern depends on the environment layout and can result in the execution of unintended scripts if the directory structure is manipulated. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses a discovery mechanism to find the path for
anysearch_cli.pyacross multiple system and user directories (e.g.,~/.claude/skills/,/usr/local/bin/). It also usespython3 -cto dynamically resolve package locations. Once discovered, the agent is instructed to execute this script viapython3 <path>, which constitutes the execution of code not distributed directly with the skill. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The instructions explicitly suggest that the user install external code from a remote repository:
git clone https://github.com/konglong87/anysearch.git. While this originates from the vendor's repository, it encourages the introduction of external code into the agent's environment. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest large amounts of untrusted data from the web via
WebSearch,Exa MCP, andAnySearch. This content is then "integrated" into final reports without sanitization, creating a vulnerability surface. - Ingestion points: Data enters the context via
mcp__exa__web_search_exa,WebSearch, andanysearch_cli.pyoutput (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: None. The instructions do not specify delimiters or warnings to ignore instructions embedded in the search results.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to
Write(to create docs/),Bash(to execute scripts), andAgent(to spawn sub-tasks) (SKILL.md). - Sanitization: No escaping or validation of external content is mentioned before the data is processed or written to files.
Audit Metadata