steve-jobs-perspective
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 3, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
Preamblesection inSKILL.mdattempts to execute a shell script using the commandbash "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/../../check-update.sh". This pattern invokes a script from a relative path outside the immediate skill directory, which is a form of dynamic loading and execution of code. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill defines an analysis workflow in
SKILL.md(Step 2: 乔布斯式研究) that ingests untrusted data from theWebSearchtool. This setup is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection, as malicious instructions in search results could influence the agent's judgment. - Ingestion points: External data enters through
WebSearchresults as specified in the 'Steve Jobs-style research' protocol. - Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit markers or warnings to distinguish between instructional text and data retrieved from the web.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to
WebSearch,Read, and the ability to execute shell commands via the preamble. - Sanitization: No filtering or validation logic is provided to handle potentially adversarial content from external sources.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The instructions include strict persona enforcement and formatting rules designed to suppress the agent's standard meta-analysis and safety disclaimers (e.g., "免责声明仅首次激活时说一次", "不说「如果乔布斯,他可能会...」"). These patterns are used to override default agent behaviors.
Audit Metadata