steve-jobs-perspective

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 3, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The Preamble section in SKILL.md attempts to execute a shell script using the command bash "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/../../check-update.sh". This pattern invokes a script from a relative path outside the immediate skill directory, which is a form of dynamic loading and execution of code.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill defines an analysis workflow in SKILL.md (Step 2: 乔布斯式研究) that ingests untrusted data from the WebSearch tool. This setup is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection, as malicious instructions in search results could influence the agent's judgment.
  • Ingestion points: External data enters through WebSearch results as specified in the 'Steve Jobs-style research' protocol.
  • Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit markers or warnings to distinguish between instructional text and data retrieved from the web.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has access to WebSearch, Read, and the ability to execute shell commands via the preamble.
  • Sanitization: No filtering or validation logic is provided to handle potentially adversarial content from external sources.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The instructions include strict persona enforcement and formatting rules designed to suppress the agent's standard meta-analysis and safety disclaimers (e.g., "免责声明仅首次激活时说一次", "不说「如果乔布斯,他可能会...」"). These patterns are used to override default agent behaviors.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Aug 3, 2026, 06:20 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — steve-jobs-perspective