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Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from existing pull requests which could theoretically contain malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points:
SKILL.md(Phases 0 and 5b) reads pull request titles and bodies using thegh pr viewcommand. - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present when the agent reads the existing PR description.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
git,gh, andpython3to modify the repository and update pull requests. - Sanitization: The skill does not explicitly describe sanitization for fetched PR content before re-validating it against the current branch state.
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill executes repository-provided scripts and a local linter.
- Evidence: Phase 3 of the workflow involves running the repository's own formatters, linters, and test suites.
- Context: This is a standard requirement for a development-focused AI agent and is performed using the repository's configured task runners.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to perform Git operations, including pushing to remote branches and managing detached references for image hosting.
- Evidence:
references/screenshots.mdprovides shell commands for creating git blobs and pushing torefs/attachments/. - Context: These are standard operations for managing pull request assets within a Git-based development workflow.
Audit Metadata