gemini-cli
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 21, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is designed to execute the
geminiCLI tool via shell commands within the agent's environment. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates a significant indirect prompt injection surface by interpolating user-provided prompts directly into shell commands without sanitization or boundary markers.
- Ingestion points: User instructions are passed to the
geminicommand via the$promptvariable inSKILL.md(lines 14, 23, 27, 28, 47). - Boundary markers: No delimiters or instructions are used to distinguish user data from agent instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill allows for autonomous tool operations and workspace modifications through the
geminiCLI. - Sanitization: The skill suggests shell variable storage but provides no actual escaping or validation for malicious shell sequences or sub-agent instructions.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides an
--approval-mode yolooption which explicitly bypasses human-in-the-loop confirmations for tool operations performed by the subordinate agent, significantly increasing the risk of automated damage from malicious prompts. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Example commands include the
--skip-trustflag, which is used to bypass internal trust and safety verification mechanisms within the CLI tool.
Audit Metadata