intensivecolearn-api
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 5, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill instructs the agent to access and source the
~/.zshrcfile to retrieve theINTENSIVE_COLEARN_APIKEY. Sourcing a shell profile is a sensitive operation as it exposes the entire contents of the file, including all environment variables, aliases, and potentially other credentials, to the agent's execution context. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow requires the agent to execute shell commands, specifically
source ~/.zshrc && export INTENSIVE_COLEARN_APIKEY, to prepare the environment for the bundled API client script. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it processes data from external API endpoints (
intensivecolearn.ing). Content returned by the API (such as program descriptions or check-in records) could contain malicious instructions designed to influence the agent. - Ingestion points: External data enters the context via
scripts/icl_api.pythrough various API operations likelist-programsandget-program. - Boundary markers: The instructions include constraints to "Return only the fields needed for the task" and require user confirmation for mutating operations.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses network communication capabilities via
urllib.request.urlopenand can read local files if specified through the--data-fileargument. - Sanitization: The skill employs standard JSON parsing (
json.loads) to process API responses.
Audit Metadata