krillinai-subtitle

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 26, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's primary command template in SKILL.md directly interpolates the <input> variable into a shell execution block: "$KRILLINAI_CLI" subtitle "<input>". While the input is enclosed in double quotes, it does not prevent subshell execution or command substitution if the input contains characters like backticks (`) or $(). This could allow a malicious input to execute arbitrary commands in the host environment.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external content from platforms like YouTube and Bilibili.
  • Ingestion points: External subtitles, platform captions, and video metadata are fetched from remote URLs provided in the <input> field (identified in SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: No delimiters or instructions are present to ensure the agent ignores malicious instructions that might be embedded in the downloaded captions or metadata.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute a CLI tool ($KRILLINAI_CLI) and perform file system operations (read/write) within the specified $WORKDIR (identified in SKILL.md).
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the content retrieved from external sources before processing.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads media and caption data from well-known services including YouTube and Bilibili. This is part of the intended functionality and targets established platforms.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Oct 26, 2026, 08:37 AM