code-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 28, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted data from external sources, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks where malicious instructions are hidden in pull request bodies, commit messages, or source code.\n
- Ingestion points: The skill fetches data via
gh pr viewandgit diffas described inreferences/review-core.md, and reads local file changes inplaybooks/local.md.\n - Boundary markers: While the skill lacks explicit technical delimiters for data isolation, it provides clear conceptual instructions to the agent to treat external content as "evidence, not tool authority."\n
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes shell commands (
git,gh), and can potentially chain to other installed tools likeimplement,playwright, oragent-browserif authorized.\n - Sanitization: There are no explicit instructions for the agent to sanitize or filter the content of pull requests or source code before processing.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the execution of various
gitandghCLI commands to retrieve repository metadata and code diffs. While these are necessary for the skill's function, they represent a potential execution vector if the agent is manipulated into running unintended arguments.\n - Evidence: Templates for commands such as
gh pr view <pr> --json ...andgit diff --binary <mergeBaseSHA> <headSHA>are provided inreferences/review-core.md.
Audit Metadata