gemini-api-2026
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill documents multiple ingestion points for untrusted external data which could contain malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points: Network fetches using
requests.get()inSKILL.md, large file uploads viaclient.files.upload()inreferences/files-and-media.md, and managed RAG indexing throughfile_search_stores.upload_to_file_search_store()inreferences/embeddings-and-rag.md. - Capability inventory: The skill facilitates network access (fetching URLs), file system interaction (reading/writing media), and browser automation (clicks, keystrokes) through the "Computer Use" feature. It also documents "Deep Research" agents capable of background autonomous tasks.
- Boundary markers: Code examples demonstrate passing raw external content (image bytes, PDF parts) directly to the model without explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands.
- Sanitization: There is no documentation regarding the sanitization or verification of external files or URL content before processing.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill describes the "Computer Use" tool which allows an agent to generate browser actions such as
click_at,type_text_at, andkey_press. This capability allows model-driven interaction with the user's environment, which is a high-impact surface if the model is influenced by malicious injected content. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill provides instructions for installing various SDKs and libraries (e.g.,
google-genai,crewai,langchain-google-genai). These appear to be official vendor resources or established ecosystem libraries associated with the documented services.
Audit Metadata