android-workmanager-notifications
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements a workflow that requires the agent to search through local codebases using
rg(ripgrep) and process the results. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection if the files being scanned contain malicious instructions designed to influence the agent's behavior. - Ingestion points: Markdown examples in
SKILL.mdandreferences/scenarios.mdprompt the agent to usergto find patterns in code, with the output becoming part of the agent's context. - Boundary markers: Absent; there are no instructions to the agent to treat search output as untrusted data or to use specific delimiters.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute shell commands, specifically
python3 scripts/eval_triggers.pyand./gradlewfor running tests, which could be targeted by an injection attack. - Sanitization: Absent; the agent is expected to read and interpret the raw output of the search results.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses local shell commands as part of its development and evaluation workflow.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdandreferences/scenarios.mdcontain commands for code searching (rg), trigger evaluation (python3 scripts/eval_triggers.py), and test execution (./gradlew :app:testDebugUnitTest). While standard for Android development, these represent executable capabilities within the skill's scope.
Audit Metadata