agentic-rules-writer
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's ecosystem discovery mechanism (Phase 4) reads names and descriptions from local
SKILL.mdfiles and incorporates them directly into the generated rules sections. This creates a surface for indirect injection if an attacker-controlled skill is present on the local system. - Ingestion points: Phase 4 scanning of user-level and project-level directories for
SKILL.mdfiles. - Boundary markers: Absent; metadata is inserted as bulleted text under Markdown headers without specific escaping or boundary delimiters.
- Capability inventory: Extensive file-writing capabilities to system and project configuration paths (e.g.,
~/.claude/CLAUDE.md,.cursorrules). - Sanitization: Absent; the skill is designed to include metadata verbatim to ensure accurate skill referencing.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The questionnaire process allows for the verbatim inclusion of user-provided build/run commands (Q13) and additional preferences (Q20) into the final instruction file.
- Ingestion points: Phase 3 questionnaire responses for Q3 and Q20.
- Boundary markers: Content is placed under
## Commandsand## Additional Rulesheaders but lacks specific sanitization. - Capability inventory: File writing to agent instruction paths.
- Sanitization: Content is included verbatim as provided by the user.
Audit Metadata