truedraft
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted user-supplied data, including notes, marking rubrics, and existing drafts, to generate or refine assignments. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions could be embedded in user content to influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the context through the Assignment Forge (user notes), the Draft stage (existing outlines/notes), and the Rewrite stage (user-pasted drafts).
- Boundary markers: The instructions do not explicitly define strict boundary markers (e.g., delimiters) for separating user input from system instructions, relying on the model's contextual understanding.
- Capability inventory: The skill can perform web searches using host tools, write project files to the
project-memory/directory, and generate long-form prose. - Sanitization: There is no explicit sanitization or filtering of user-provided content before it is interpolated into the planning or drafting prompts.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill recommends the installation of companion tools from the author's GitHub repository to enhance research and writing capabilities.
- Evidence: Instructions in
SKILL.mdandREADME.mdsuggest usingnpx skills addto downloadresearch-dojoandcalligraph-senseifromhttps://github.com/kshanxs/skill-dojo. These references are to the author's own repository and are documented as standard extension of functionality.
Audit Metadata